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Abstract 
 
The energy world is today full of uncertainty: many developments contributed to a 
situation where it has become increasingly difficult to predict future trends. At the 
same time, the European Union’s gas import dependency is growing, and thereby 
also risks that have the potential to jeopardise the EU’s security of gas supply. Thus, 
while the situation becomes increasingly difficult, it is also more and more important 
for the EU to know the risks that challenge its secure supply of gas. Only when the EU 
is able to identify and evaluate the different risk dimensions adequately, it will be 
able to successfully manage and reduce these risks. As a growing international actor 
the EU will have to assume the task of risk management, not only because of the 
added value of its action in this field but also because this will prevent the member 
states from drafting risk management strategies  which are entirely national. This 
paper asks what the main risks to the EU’s security of gas supply are and how they 
can be reduced. It provides a comprehensive risk analysis, followed by a second 
part dedicated to the management of these risks. It is argued that the transit risk 
posed by Ukraine represents the highest risk to the EU’s security of gas supply. 
Moreover, although the EU has some useful means at hand to reduce the transit risk, 
its capacity to do so will largely depend on Russia’s policies towards Ukraine. 
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1.   Introduction: natural gas and EU energy security 
 
  “The energy world faces unprecedented uncertainty.” 1 These are the first 
words of the executive summary of the World Energy Outlook 2010, published by the 
International Energy Agency  (IEA). By nature, uncertainty is closely linked to 
insecurity. Thus, more than ever, uncertainty has also the potential to put at risk the 
energy security of the European Union (EU). 
  What can be said with certainty is that the EU’s gas import dependency 
increased significantly in the last decade and will also do so in the future,2 making 
the EU up to 80% dependent on imported gas in the next decades.3 This is mainly 
due to the depletion of domestic gas reserves but also to the EU’s increasing 
demand for gas as low-carbon fuel natural gas is likely to be boosted by the EU’s 
ambitious climate change policy.  
  More than 80% of the global natural gas reserves are located in areas that 
allow EU gas imports  through  pipelines.4 In addition, liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
supplies are transported by cargoes to the EU’s regasification terminals with sea 
access. Thus, the EU will not run out of natural gas in the foreseeable future. However, 
it will become increasingly important for the EU to identify and evaluate the risks 
related to the gas import dependency. As a growing international actor the EU relies 
on objective risk assessments in order to be able to manage those risks successfully.5 
Thus, while it is not useful to stoke fears of energy insecurity, the EU should at the 
same time not underestimate the potential risks stemming from its strong import 
dependency either. 
This paper tries to find an answer to the following question: what are the main 
risks to the EU’s security of gas supply (SoS) and how can they be reduced? 
Concerning the SoS analysis, the hypothesis is  that the risk dimensions changed 
significantly in the last decade, making the transit risk the most threatening for the 
EU’s gas SoS. With regard to the risk management, which represents the second part 
                                                           
1 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2010, Paris, 2010, p. 45. 
2 A. Macintosh, “Security of Europe’s Gas Supply: EU Vulnerability”, CEPS Policy Brief, no. 222, 
Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2010, p. 1. 
3 F.-L. Henry, “Europe’s Gas Supply Security: Rating Source Country Risk”, CEPS Policy Brief, no. 
220, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2010, p. 4. 
4 A. Behrens, “Learning from the Crisis: A Market Approach to Securing European Natural Gas 
Supplies”, CEPS Policy Brief, no. 183, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2009, p. 2. 
5 The necessity to carry out risk assessments was also acknowledged in the Regulation No. 
994/2010 concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply of December 2010. 
European Commission, DG Energy, Security of gas supply in the EU, Brussels, 2010. EU Diplomacy Papers 10/2011 
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of the study, it is argued that the EU has the potential to significantly reduce the 
Ukrainian  transit risk but  that  its  capacity to do so will  in the long  term  strongly 
depend on Russia’s policies towards Ukraine.  This is due to the fact that Russia’s 
benevolence will be crucial to the success of both the European Energy Community 
and a tripartite gas consortium.  
It is worth underlining that import independence is not an objective in itself 
and would imply tremendous investments, if it is feasible at all.6 Since the EU’s import 
dependence will further rise in the future and thereby also the risks related to the 
import of gas, the focus should rather be on how to deal with import dependence 
instead of how to eliminate it. Moreover, even full energy independence would not 
entail full SoS for the EU. Indeed, many of the supply interruptions that the EU faced in 
the last decades were also caused by domestic problems.7   
  Yet, the EU’s high gas import dependency implies risks that have mainly 
external origins. Thus, drawing on the concept of SoS brought up by Stern,8 mostly the 
external risks to the EU’s SoS will be analysed,  not denying that there are also 
considerable internal risks.9 This focus on the external risks will be reflected in the risk 
management. 
 
2.   The changing context of the security of gas supply 
“The global financial crisis and following economic recession have 
caused major confusion in energy and gas markets fundamentals 
around the world. While gas demand declined in the wake of the 
economic downturn, new supply surged thanks to an increase in 
the world supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and an increase in 
shale gas production in the US.”10 
 
The EU’s import dependency was recently affected by four different but partly 
interlinked developments: (1) the global financial and economic crisis, (2) the rise of 
LNG on the global energy markets, (3) the US shale gas revolution, and (4) the EU 
climate change and energy policy. 
                                                           
6 J.-M. Chevalier, “Security of energy supply for the European Union”, European Review of 
Energy Markets, vol. 1, no. 3, 2006, p. 6. 
7 Behrens, op.cit., p. 2.  
8 J. Stern, Security of European Natural Gas Supplies: The Impact of Import Dependence and 
Liberalization, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2002. 
9 For instance, technical failures of the EU’s pipeline system or the lack of reverse flow and 
storage capacities can be considered as internal risks to the EU’s SoS. 
10 A. Honoré, “Economic recession and natural gas demand in Europe: what happened in 
2008-2010?”, NG 47, Oxford, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2011, p. 14. Anselm Ritter 
6 
 
First, the global financial and economic crisis curbed down the EU’s demand 
for gas, thereby obviously strengthening the EU’s SoS in the short term since 
additional and relatively cheap gas supplies were available.11 However, the drop of 
the gas demand resulted in a sharp cutting of all investments in the energy sector, 
thus putting at risk the EU’s gas SoS in the long-term view. 12 It is difficult if not 
impossible to estimate how severely this lack of investments will affect the EU’s SoS in 
ten to fifteen years, depending mainly on how investors will react to a growing EU 
demand for gas. This double-effect was best described by Lewiner: “the financial 
crisis has hit both demand and the planned investments in energy leading to short-
term relief in electricity and gas security of supply. This may change in the long term 
because of deferred infrastructure investments and new technology”.13 
Second, the global rise of LNG on the energy markets14 had also a two-fold 
impact on the EU’s SoS: most importantly, LNG increased the EU’s SoS by strengthen-
ing the diversification of the origins of gas imports and transport routes. However, 
LNG is not in itself a panacea for the EU’s SoS, as it requires large investments and as 
the transport of gas is capital-intensive compared to traditional pipeline transport. In 
addition, the share of LNG in the EU’s gas imports can only be increased to a certain 
extent, mainly due to long-term contracts with traditional pipeline suppliers.15 As a 
secondary effect, LNG helped to link the traditionally regional gas markets, meaning 
that the EU’s SoS is now increasingly influenced by the gas supply and demand in 
other parts of the world. 
Third, US shale gas revolution that almost resulted in self-sufficiency of the US 
energy market would be a rather regional development without the global rise of 
LNG.16 Indeed, the profound transformation of the US energy market through the 
development of shale gas significantly affected the EU’s SoS: the sharp decline of 
                                                           
11 Thus, the IEA observed a cutback in the gas demand of 5,6% in OECD Europe in 2009 
compared to the previous year. Honoré, op.cit., p. 3. 
12 According to the IEA, this already in 2009 resulted in an estimated reduction of more than 
20% of investments in the oil and gas sector. International Energy Agency, The Impact of the 
Financial and Economic Crisis on Global Energy Investment, Paris, 2009, p. 3. 
13 C. Lewiner, “The Financial Crisis and its Impact on European Energy Security of Supply”, 
ParisTech Review, Paris, The Paris Institute of Technology, 29 July 2010, p. 3. 
14 Considerable cost reductions in all parts of the LNG chain made LNG imports increasingly 
profitable for shorter distances. P. Cayrade, “Investments in Gas Pipelines and Liquefied 
Natural Gas Infrastructure. What is the Impact on the Security of Supply?”, INDES Working 
Paper, no. 3, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2004, p. 4.  
15 Today, LNG imports represent about 15% of EU gas imports, whereas 85% of EU gas is still 
imported through pipelines. A. Goldthau & J.M. Witte, Global energy governance: The new 
rules of the game, Berlin, Global Public Policy Institute, 2010, p. 235. 
16 International Energy Agency, Medium-term oil & gas markets 2010. Executive summary, 
Paris, 2010, p. 4. EU Diplomacy Papers 10/2011 
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LNG imports in the US made additional LNG supplies available on the global LNG 
market. Since energy hungry countries such as India or China are expected to 
experience their own shale gas development, it is the EU that is likely to benefit the 
most from the US shale gas revolution.17 However, the EU’s capacity to benefit from 
additional LNG supplies will depend on the number of regasification terminals in the 
EU and means to transport the additional gas to those member states that do not 
have sea access. Moreover, it is extremely difficult if not impossible to predict the 
future development of US shale gas. Tighter regulations could reduce economic 
incentives for the shale gas production in the US, thereby reducing the positive SoS 
effect for the EU.18 
Fourth, the EU’s energy and climate change policy itself had and will have a 
decisive impact on the EU’s gas SoS. Due to the integrated approach taken by the 
European Commission to deal consistently with climate change and energy,19 the 
demand for gas will be dependent on the EU’s commitment to its climate change 
policy. On the one hand, gas as a relatively low-carbon energy source is promoted 
by the Commission. Hence, the gradually growing EU demand for gas will go hand in 
hand with increasing import dependency and related risks to the large-scale import 
of gas. The more member states will phase out nuclear energy,  as Germany  did 
recently, the faster the EU demand for gas will grow and the sharper the increase in 
the import dependency will be. On the other hand, considerable investments in 
renewable energy and a bigger share of renewables in the EU’s overall energy mix 
have the potential to slow down the EU’s growing gas import dependency.  
  Thus, while all those four developments recently improved the EU’s gas SoS, 
some of them obviously did more than others. The impact of the global financial and 
economic crisis and the EU’s energy and climate change policy is rather ambiguous 
in contrast to the rise of LNG and the shale gas development that considerably 
strengthened the EU’s SoS in the medium- to long-term view. 
 
   
                                                           
17 E. Paszyc, “Nord and South Stream won’t save Gazprom”, OSW Commentary,  issue 35, 
Warsaw, Centre for Eastern Studies, 2010, p. 5. However, due to higher environmental 
standards and a higher population density, the EU is not likely to see an internal shale gas 
development.  
18 Henry, op.cit., p. 3. 
19 A. Behrens, A. Checchi & C. Egenhofer, “Long-Term Energy Security Risks for Europe: A 
Sector-Specific Approach”, CEPS Working Document No. 309, Brussels, Centre for European 
Policy Studies, 2009, p. 5. Anselm Ritter 
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3.   The concept of gas security of supply 
 
The concept of security of supply is a rather flexible approach depending on 
the security dimension (political, economic, environmental, etc.) that is analysed. 
Accordingly, international organisations do not follow a homogenous definition for 
SoS.20 
  The following SoS analysis relies on the concept of SoS as introduced by Stern 
in 2002; he divides the risks related to the import of gas supplies into source 
dependence, transit dependence  and facility dependence, resulting in three 
different risk dimensions.21 Hereby, the facility risk will be broadened to include also 
the investment risk dimension. 
 
3.1   Source risk 
The source risk is determined by the self-sufficiency capacity and import 
dependency of a country, as domestic gas reserves generally reduce the risk related 
to the import of gas.22 Moreover, the number and the reliability23 of gas suppliers 
have an important impact on the SoS. In addition, the question of vulnerability of a 
gas importing country is important, being determined by the country’s structure of 
gas consumption.24 Since gas can be easily substituted by other energy sources such 
as coal or renewables, the degree of diversification of a country’s energy mix in 
general also plays an important role. Last but not least, the diversification within the 
gas import sector itself can also affect positively the country’s SoS. Thus, a 
considerable share of LNG imports might help to reduce the negative impact of 
sudden rupture in pipeline supplies.  
  In order to determine a country’s source risk, all these criteria have to be taken 
into account. Therefore, even if a country imports its gas from a single supplier and 
even if these imports represent a large share of the domestic energy mix, a country 
                                                           
20 Even the European Commission and the European Parliament have a quite different 
understanding of SoS. C. Egenhofer, T. Legge & C.-E. Nyquist, “Security of Energy Supply. A 
Question for Policy or the Markets?”, Report of a CEPS Working Party, Brussels, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, 2001, p. 4. 
21 Stern, op.cit., p. 12. 
22 Van der Linde, Coby et al., “Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics,” Final Report, 
Clingendael International Energy Programme, The Hague, Institute for International Relations 
‘Clingendael’, 2004, p. 65. 
23 Henry, op.cit., p. 1. 
24 For instance, if gas imports provide mainly for the supply of households, a sudden shortage 
might have quite serious consequences. P. Noël, “Beyond dependence: how to deal with 
Russian gas”, Policy Brief, London, European Council on Foreign Relations, 2008, p. 13. EU Diplomacy Papers 10/2011 
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can still have a relatively strong gas SoS. This is, for example, the case when there is 
significant political stability in the exporting country or high disincentives in terms of 
economic losses to interrupt the gas trade. 
 
3.2   Transit risk 
The pipeline transport of gas to the EU often involves transit countries, whereby 
the number of transit countries has a direct impact on the EU’s SoS: “[e]ach border 
crossed adds an additional layer of security risk with the potential for conflict within 
these transit countries”.25 There are at least three parties involved in the gas trade of 
which all have widely different interests: the exporting, the transit and the importing 
country.  
  The consumer’s SoS can be negatively affected by political instability in the 
transit country or by the fact that the transit country is itself a remarkable consumer 
of gas since it might be tempted to prioritise its own SoS over EU concerns. Thus, the 
transit risk does not only refer to the physical rupture on the territory of the transit 
country but also to its possible monopolistic behaviour.26 Moreover, the degree of 
transit risk is also shaped by the quality of relations between the three parties 
involved in the gas trade. Often, there is a strong political or commercial dimension 
related to the transit risk which makes it “much trickier to handle”.27 As Stevens points 
out, transit pipelines induce an inherent instability to the gas trade: 
for any transit pipeline agreement there is no overarching jurisdiction to manage 
it, and as a result no obvious mechanism for its enforcement. Thus ultimately a 
‘sovereign’ government can simply ignore what is after all only a piece of paper. 
[…] Put simply, oil and gas transit pipelines are inherently unstable with no obvious 
mechanism, at least to date, to control or constrain that instability.28 
  Thus, the transit risk does not only appear as the most complex involving at 
least three parties with partly opposing interests, but so far it is also the risk that is the 
least manageable by the means of an overarching legal framework.  
 
3.3   Investment and facility risk 
Another risk dimension relates to the sufficiency of investments in the export, 
transit and import infrastructures  that are necessary to ensure the long-term 
                                                           
25 Stern, op.cit., p. 14.  Therefore, by bringing the EU and Russia closer together, the EU’s 
enlargement process towards Eastern Europe substantially helped to boil down the transit risk. 
26 Macintosh, op.cit., p. 5. 
27 Henry, op.cit., p. 2. 
28 P. Stevens, “Transit troubles: Pipelines as a source of conflict”, A Catham House Report, 
London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2009, p. 1. Anselm Ritter 
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adequacy of gas supplies. While this concerns investments within but also beyond 
the EU,29 this paper focuses mainly on the investments in the transit and exporting 
country. By nature, the investment risk is higher in times of economic crisis where all 
kinds of investments are reduced by uncertainty. A special feature of the investment 
risk is the difficulty to determine its scope since the effect of cancelled investments 
becomes only evident with a time lag of ten to fifteen years. 
Closely linked to the lack of investments is the facility risk, as sufficient invest-
ments  in pipelines, upstream infrastructure and storage facilities in the importing, 
exporting and transit country significantly help to reduce the possibility of technical 
failures posing a serious risk to the EU’s gas SoS. While it may be relatively easy for the 
EU to carry out necessary investments in its own pipeline system, it is much more 
difficult for the EU to reduce the facility risk in the transit and supply countries. 
 
4.   Risk analysis of the EU’s gas security of supply 
 
4.1   Source risk 
Due to the decreasing EU domestic gas production and an increasing 
demand for natural gas in the long term, 30 the EU will face a growing import 
dependency in the next decades.31 As a consequence, at least in theory also the 
risks related to the import are expected to grow, including the source risk. For the 
time being, all of the EU’s main gas suppliers can be described as reliable and safe 
partners.32 In 2008, 46% of the overall gas imports came from Russia, while 27% were 
imported from Norway and 20% from Algeria, making them the EU’s most important 
partners in gas trade.33  
  In terms of gas reserves, logistics and geography, Russia should be considered 
as the “the most obvious supplier for Europe’s growing gas demand”.34 For many 
reasons, there is nearly no source risk related to gas imports originating from Russia, at 
                                                           
29 A. Behrens, C. Egenhofer & K. Pedersen, “Energy Policy for Europe. Identifying the European 
added-value”, CEPS Task Force Report, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2008, p. 
21. 
30 Although the EU’s gas demand saw the sharpest decline in its history following the global 
economic and financial crisis, it is expected to recover in the next years. 
31 Behrens, Checchi & Egenhofer, op.cit., p. 14. 
32 Henry, op.cit., p. 1.  
33 S. Nies, “Ukraine : un pays de transit dans l’impasse ? Edition actualisée après les élections 
de 2010”,  Gouvernance européenne et géopolitique de l’énergie, no. 9, Paris, Institut 
Français des Relations Internationales, 2010, p. 44. 
34 Goldthau & Witte, op.cit., pp. 234, 235. EU Diplomacy Papers 10/2011 
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least in the short term:35 the existing pipeline connection between Russia and the EU 
creates a strong interdependence  that is reinforced by a lock-in effect. From 
Moscow’s perspective, building new pipelines to deliver Russian gas to Asia at the 
expense of the EU’s SoS would imply tremendous investments that Gazprom cannot 
afford due to its miserable financial situation.36 In the words of Riley, “Russia really has 
nowhere else to sell its gas and certainly no other such rich market”.37 Especially after 
the global financial crisis that resulted in a lower EU demand and a considerable 
Russian gas glut, Russia will not be able to convincingly threaten to interrupt its gas 
supplies to the EU since its economy relies heavily on the EU’s gas bills. The only risk 
related to Russia as origin for EU gas imports may be its possible incapacity to satisfy 
the growing EU gas demand in the long-term: 
According to available estimates, in order to meet its obligations by 2020, 
Gazprom will have to seriously revamp and expand its gas transportation system, 
including the trunk pipelines and compressor systems, in order to maintain gas 
supply, potentially costing billions.38  
Pre-crisis forecasts already predicted an approaching Russian gas deficit 
caused by insufficient investments in recent years. 39 The cutting of investments in the 
wake of the economic crisis may lead to an even more dramatic scenario for the EU 
in ten to fifteen years. Hence, Riley can be confirmed when he says that  
the core issue for the EU is not the threat of a politically motivated gas cut off. 
Rather it is the prospect of Russia, through lack of investment, not being able to 
produce enough gas to cover Russian and EU demands.
40 
  While the source risk for Russia is low, it is very low for Algeria and almost non-
existing for Norway: despite Algeria’s relative political instability, the EU’s third gas 
supplier proved to be a reliable partner in terms of gas trade: “It remains a fact, of 
course, that there have never been problems in the supply of gas as a consequence 
of domestic unrest in Algeria.”41 As a member of the European Economic Area and 
                                                           
35 The Russian source risk is even declining: since the 1990s the Russian gas imports as share of 
the EU’s overall gas imports decreased gradually. Noël, op.cit., p. 5. 
36 Henry, op.cit., p. 4. 
37 A. Riley, “The Coming of the Russian Gas Deficit: Consequences and Solutions”, CEPS Policy 
Brief, no. 116, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2006, p. 8. 
38 Macintosh, op.cit., p. 5. 
39 M. Emerson & E. Gnedina, “The Case for a Gas Transit Consortium in Ukraine: A Cost-Benefit 
Analysis”, CEPS Policy Brief, no. 180, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2009, p. 5. 
40 Riley, op.cit., p. 1. 
41 Van der Linde et al., op.cit., p. 61. Anselm Ritter 
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as the EU’s second most important source of natural gas, Norway proved to be the 
EU’s safest partner in the gas trade.42 
  Finally, it is worth emphasising that also LNG imports are in general not free of 
a  certain source risk.43 However, cancelled LNG cargoes can be easily compen-
sated by other LNG supplies, thereby making LNG imports in general less prone to the 
source risk compared to pipeline deliveries. 
  Looking at the EU member states individually, it is rather obvious that they all 
face different degrees of source risk since the origin of their gas imports and the 
share of their LNG imports varies significantly. Thus, while the overall source risk of the 
EU is rather low, some individual member states in Eastern Europe face a 
considerable source risk.44  
 
4.2   Transit risk 
  Most of the EU’s gas imports are transported through pipelines that cross either 
Ukraine or Belarus.45 Since the transit risk related to gas imports from Algeria is low 
and non-existing in the case of Norway (as the country is the EU’s direct neighbour), 
the focus in this section will be on the considerable transit risk linked to Russian gas 
imports crossing Ukrainian territory.46 
  Ukraine has been described as “one of the world’s primary energy transit 
countries”47 and has been identified by the EU as a key transit country in terms of gas 
imports.48 This is due to the fact that around 80% of Russian gas transits Ukraine on its 
way to the EU. 49 From the EU’s  perspective, about 40% of the total amount of 
                                                           
42  F. Harbo, “The European Gas and Oil Market: The Role of Norway“,  Gouvernance 
européenne et géopolitique de l’énergie, Paris, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 
2008, p. 7. 
43 Stern, op.cit., p. 16. 
44 In 2005, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia faced a 100% 
dependence on Russian gas imports. F. Umbach, “Global energy security and the 
implications for the EU”, Energy Policy, vol. 38, no. 3, 2010, p. 1236. 
45 Macintosh, op.cit., p. 5. While around 80% of Russian gas supplies to the EU transits Ukraine, 
only 20% cross the territory of Belarus.  
46 Henry, op.cit., p. 3. 
47 N. Shapovalova, “Ukraine: Lynchpin for European Energy Security”, FRIDE Democracy Back-
grounders, Madrid, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, 2007, 
p. 2. 
48 K. Malyhina, “Die Erdgasversorgung der EU unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Ukraine 
als Transitland”, Arbeitspapiere und Materialien, no. 105, Bremen, Forschungsstelle Osteuropa, 
2009, p. 26. 
49 Ibid. EU Diplomacy Papers 10/2011 
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imported gas transits Ukrainian territory before reaching the EU border. 50 With a 
powerful pipeline system of more than 35.000 km, a yearly gas transit capacity at an 
average of more than 120 bcm, 51 and globally the third largest gas storage 
capacities, Ukraine is of tremendous importance for the EU’s SoS. 
  However, the combination of many factors makes Ukrainian gas transit a 
delicate issue: Ukraine’s obsolescent pipeline system;  the fact that it is itself a 
considerable gas consumer; and most importantly commercial and political disputes 
between Ukraine and Russia about the gas transit. While Ukraine tries to maintain its 
significance as a transit country and ensure transit fees, Russia is willing to reduce the 
transit risk posed by Ukraine through efforts to take over the Ukrainian pipeline system 
or by building new pipelines such as North Stream that allow circumventing Ukraine. 
So far, Ukraine has rejected all initiatives made by Russia to gain control  over  its 
pipeline system since the system is of a strategic importance for the government and 
allows domestic gas prices  to be subsidised heavily. 52 The lack of privatisation, 
corruption and immense inefficiency led in the past to Ukraine’s incapability to pay 
its gas bills to Russia, causing the disruption of Russian gas supplies and usually 
Ukraine’s threat to cut off gas deliveries to the EU.53 
  Until now, there is no legal framework that has the potential to effectively 
regulate the gas transit and thus reduce the transit risk for the EU. In theory, the 
European Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) could help to reduce risks related to the transit 
through Ukrainian territory.54 However, Russia signed but did not ratify the treaty yet, 
which contributed to the ECT’s failure. This has been evident in both crises in 2006 
and 2009 where the ECT did not play any role in the conflict resolution.55 Negotiations 
on a transit protocol that would have allowed broadening the scope of the transit 
provisions and including a legally binding dispute resolution procedure were equally 
unsuccessful. 56 
                                                           
50  J. Grätz &  K. Westphal, “Die Ukraine in der Energiegemeinschaft: Die Zukunft des 
Gastransits. Der ukrainische Gasmarkt zwischen Monopolisierung und Entflechtung”,  SWP-
Aktuell, no. 13, Berlin, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2011, p. 5. 
51 Nies, op.cit., p. 43. 
52 S. Pirani, “Ukraine’s gas sector”, NG 21, Oxford, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2007, p. 
73. 
53 Malyhina, op.cit., p. 46. 
54 Henry, op.cit., p. 2. 
55 Malyhina, op.cit., p. 42. 
56 Ibid., p. 19.  Anselm Ritter 
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  Again, the overall EU picture is different from the SoS situation in the member 
states. Especially some Eastern member states rely extremely on Ukrainian gas transit 
which was demonstrated by the 2009 gas crisis when they were seriously affected. 
  While the North Stream pipeline will reduce the Ukrainian gas transit volume, it 
will certainly not have the potential to resolve the Ukrainian transit problem, since a 
considerable amount of gas will still cross Ukrainian territory.57 
 
4.3   Investment and facility risk 
By creating unprecedented uncertainty, the global financial and economic 
crisis has led to a boiling down of all kinds of investments in the energy sector, 
thereby considerably increasing the investment risk compared to pre-crisis times.58 
Uncertainty can create serious damage to investment projects and thereby put at 
risk the long-term EU security of supply: 
Contradictory estimates in gas demand present a pertinent threat, as they cause 
exporters to underinvest in new supplies or fail to develop necessary new 
infrastructure. The result of the present lack of clarity within the EU and 
consequent underinvestment would lead to serious security of supply issues in 
natural gas that could not be solved in the short or medium terms.59 
  It is nearly impossible to measure the extent of uncertainty and the impact it 
will have in the end on the EU’s SoS. However, it is clear that uncertainty and the 
related delay of investments have more than ever in the  past the potential to 
jeopardise the EU’s long-term SoS.  The EU may partly  be able to reduce the 
investment risk through investments in gas pipelines, storage capacity, reverse flow 
capacity and interconnectors within the EU. However, the much bigger investment 
risk for the EU stems from the lack of investments in the Russian upstream sector. 
Palpably, it will be too late to carry out these investments when the EU demand will 
have swallowed the current Russian gas glut. This is due to the long-time lag between 
the investment decisions and the moment where the investment actually affects the 
SoS. Hence, much depends on the right moment for the execution of investments in 
order to prevent the EU from undergoing supply shortages due to an investment 
gap. 
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  In addition, tremendous investments are necessary in the old-fashioned 
Ukrainian transit system that has been constructed during the Soviet era. In 2010, 
21,5% of its pipelines exceeded the economic lifetime that Naftogaz estimated at 33 
years. Another 65,8% were between 10 and 33 years old and only 13% less than 10 
years. 60 This explains the “urgent need to modernize the network and fund its 
expansion”. 61 However, Naftogaz’ disastrous financial situation and the lack of 
foreign investment resulted in an extremely slow modernisation process.62 As the 
Ukrainian government will not be able to provide on its own for the immense 
investments, and since the privatisation of the pipeline system is forbidden by law, 
the country will be dependent on external financial support.63 However, bearing in 
mind the strategic significance of the pipeline system, the country was in the past 
skeptical if not reluctant to accept any external involvement in its gas production or 
transit management. 64  Moreover, the prospective of finding investors for the 
modernisation of the pipeline system is paralysed by “the political battles and 
prolonged uncertainty over the network’s future management and ownership”.65 At 
this point, the investment and facility risk is fairly interwoven with the transit risk posed 
by gas imports across Ukraine. 
  Again, all member states do not face the same investment and facility risk. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a group of member states that is likely to be 
particularly concerned: those member states that import a large share of their 
overall gas from Russia will be significantly affected by both investments that are not 
carried out in the Russian upstream sector and the Ukrainian pipeline system. 
 
4.4  Summary 
  Putting the SoS analysis in the context of the global financial and economic 
crisis, the global rise of LNG, the US shale gas development and the EU’s energy and 
climate change policy help to understand that the EU’s gas SoS in general looks 
rather safe. More specifically, the SoS analysis allowed to explore the different risk 
dimensions and to confirm the first hypothesis: while the source risk is the lowest, 
especially in the short term, the transit risk must be considered the most threatening 
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to the EU’s SoS both in the short and long term. This is due to the tremendous risk 
related to the transit of Russian gas through Ukrainian territory. Moreover, there is a 
constant facility risk linked to Ukraine’s pipeline system. The investment risk has 
increased dramatically with the financial and economic crisis, representing an 
obvious risk to the EU’s SoS in the long run. Indeed, postponed investments in the 
Russian upstream sector could in the long term trigger also a significant source risk for 
the EU. Clearly, the investment and facility risk is strongly interwoven with the two 
other risk dimensions. 
 
5.   Risk management of the EU’s gas security of supply 
 
Building on the results of the SoS analysis, the following part examines how the 
different risks can be tackled most adequately, aiming at answering the second part 
of the research question. Since the transit risk has been identified as the most 
threatening to the EU’s SoS, this will be reflected in the risk management. The second 
hypothesis is the following: while the EU has some instruments at hand to effectively 
reduce the transit risk, the success of the EU’s risk management will largely depend 
on Russia.  
The EU’s growing gas import dependency by nature implies that a certain 
level of all risks will always persist. Moreover, addressing those risks has to be seen in a 
cost-benefit analysis: at a certain point it will become exorbitantly expensive to 
strengthen the SoS through further measures while the additional gains in terms of 
reduced risks may be rather insignificant. 
 
5.1   Management of the source risk 
  As has been demonstrated, the risk related to the source of EU gas supplies is 
rather low and very low when considering only Norway and Algeria.66 Therefore, the 
need for diversification of sources of gas imports should not be overrated. But this 
takes only into account the picture of the EU as a whole. When considering the 
individual import profiles of the member states, it is obvious that the exposure among 
the member states to the source risk related to Russian gas is quite heterogeneous. 
To be more precise, while some member states are largely dependent on Russia as 
single gas supplier, others have a strong domestic gas production or have quite 
diversified gas import sources. As it will be extremely expensive to build new pipelines 
that will allow diversifying the origins of gas imports for the member states 
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concerned, it is rather worth analysing the potential impact of increased LNG imports 
on the SoS. Since the import of LNG requires regasification terminals that are located 
close to the sea, this will not be an option for all member states. However, particularly 
in Eastern Europe where member states face a relatively high source risk, the 
construction of new LNG regasification plants could have a substantial impact on 
the member states’ SoS. Moreover, in order to make better use of this investment, 
those member states with sea access “could play the role of [a] receiving station for 
the rest of the region”.67 For instance, the planned Adria LNG terminal that could be 
operational in 2014 has the potential to reduce considerably the source (and also 
transit) risk in some member states located in South Eastern Europe that traditionally 
face a high level of source risk.68 The construction of other regasification terminals in 
Romania  (Constanţa  LNG  Terminal  project),  Poland  (Swinoujscie  LNG  Terminal), 
Lithuania and Estonia could further contribute to a higher gas SoS level in the Eastern 
member states.69  
  Moreover, the source risk could be considerably reduced through internal 
mechanisms. First,  the energy efficiency70 could be improved, scaling down the 
need for gas imports. Second, member states could upgrade their storage 
capacities71 and invest in interconnectors.72 Upgrading the reverse flow capacities 
from Western to Eastern Europe would be another option to reduce the effects of 
gas shortages in particularly concerned member states. Since gas can be easily 
substituted with other energy sources, investments in other domestically produced 
energy sources appear useful. Hereby, investments in renewables could make an 
especially valuable contribution to the member states’ SoS. Taking into account the 
non-existing source risk related to Norway, a further boost of the import levels could 
also slightly contribute to an improved SoS for the EU in gas.  
To make it clear, managing the source risk does not imply replacing Russian 
gas imports in general. It is rather about increasing diversification of sources of gas 
imports in some specific member states. In other member states investments in the 
additional diversification of import sources seem unnecessary. 
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5.2   Management of the transit risk 
The SoS analysis has demonstrated the following: none of the risks related to 
the import of gas is as dangerous for the EU as the transit risk and no transit country 
puts the EU’s SoS more at risk than Ukraine does. Therefore, the risk management will 
focus on means to reduce the transit risk posed by Ukraine. Three different scenarios 
will be presented: firstly, the strengthening of the Energy Community Treaty which 
Ukraine joined recently; secondly, the outlook of a tripartite gas pipeline consortium 
involving the EU, Russia and Ukraine; finally, the perspective of circumventing Ukraine 
as transit country through new import routes by both pipelines and LNG. The risk 
management of the transit risk relies on the hypothesis that the EU’s capacity to 
reduce the transit risk posed by Ukraine will to a large extent depend on Russia’s 
policies towards Ukraine. 
 
5.2.1   The Energy Community 
  The Energy Community was set up in 2005 with the main purpose to “extend 
the EU internal energy market to South-East Europe and beyond”. 73 The Energy 
Community’s objective is to strengthen regional energy market harmonisation 
among the EU’s South Eastern neighbours. In the long term, this regional integration 
project  is supposed to  become part of an overall European energy market.74 All 
contracting parties committed themselves to “implementing selected parts of the 
acquis communautaire  on electricity, gas, renewables, energy efficiency, 
competition, environment and security of supply”.75 Through its full membership in the 
Energy Community in February 2011 Ukraine committed itself to executing within a 
very limited period of time comprehensive reforms that also include provisions on the 
security of supply.  
  Without any doubt, the Energy Community provides for a unique opportunity 
to improve the EU’s SoS by considerably reducing the transit risk related to Russian 
imports. The inclusion of Ukraine in the EU energy market would allow negotiating the 
transit issue not between Ukraine and Russia – subject to repeated gas disputes – but 
shifting on the EU-Russia level.76 Similarly, it has been argued that the handing-over of 
the ownership of the gas from Gazprom to European companies could be shifted 
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from the Ukrainian-European to the Ukrainian-Russian border.77 A full integration of 
the Energy Community in the EU energy market would empower the EU to shape its 
own Eastern transit region and to manage itself the transit risk in the long  term.78 
Being part of the EU’s energy market, more investors would be inclined to contribute 
to the modernisation of the Ukrainian pipeline system. Moreover, since the takeover 
of the EU’s acquis  by Ukraine implies more transparency in the gas markets and 
reduced governmental subsidies for the Ukrainian customers, Ukrainian membership 
of  the Energy Community would have the effect of contributing considerably to 
improve Naftogaz’ financial situation. In the end, this would enable Naftogaz to pay 
its gas bills to Gazprom and thereby reduce the likelihood of future gas disputes 
between the two countries. 
  However, the fate of the Energy Community could be stalled by Moscow’s 
reluctance to accept the takeover of the EU acquis by Ukraine.79 Not only Russia 
considers this development as a strengthening of the EU’s position in its traditional 
sphere of influence but it also wants to avoid a reform process that makes Ukraine a 
more reliable transit country for the EU. Instead, it prefers to make Ukraine appear as 
an  unreliable transit country in order to get the EU’s support for new pipelines 
bypassing Ukraine. This will give Russia economic benefits in terms of lower transit fees 
and reduce the transit risk that it faces itself. In addition, the EU’s weak monitoring 
and sanctioning powers entail the risk that Ukraine will not be able to carry out the 
relevant reforms within the indicated time period.80 
 
5.2.2   A tripartite gas pipeline consortium 
  From a practical point of view, a tripartite gas transit consortium might be the 
best option in order to deal with the transit issue, bringing together Russia as gas 
supplier, Ukraine as gas transmitter and the EU as gas consumer.81 While both the EU 
and Russia were traditionally in favour of a tripartite gas consortium, Ukraine opposed 
this project in the past, fearing Gazprom’s dominance.82 However, in 2010 Ukraine’s 
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newly elected President proposed a tripartite consortium as an alternative to Russia’s 
plan to diversify its export routes.83 
  A major advantage of the tripartite consortium would be that it brings all 
parties concerned into an institutional framework, bearing in mind that “the EU 
cannot have any meaningful cooperation on gas with Ukraine, without Russia being 
part of […] a wider cooperation framework”.84 It has been argued convincingly that 
the consortium project could be a win-win-win situation.85 It would allow Russia to 
considerably reduce the transit risk that it faces.86  Moreover, this would allow boiling 
down transit fees and increasing Russian influence in the Ukrainian pipeline system. 
For  Ukraine, this would entail the possibility to allocate sufficient funds for the 
maintenance of its pipeline system. More importantly, the consortium idea would 
make sure that Ukraine will preserve its major status as transit country.87  
  For the EU, the consortium proposal would have a major effect on its SoS: 
comprehensive reforms in the Ukrainian gas market would improve Naftogaz’ ability 
to meet its financial obligations vis-à-vis Gazprom, thereby tackling the root of 
Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes.88 Moreover, Russia would rethink its strategy of making 
Ukraine appear as an unreliable transit country for the EU, hoping for the EU’s support 
for new pipeline projects that circumvent Ukrainian territory. Without a doubt, this 
strategy played an important role in both gas crises in 2006 and 2009. According to 
Emerson, the consortium proposal would also allow separating “(technically, 
politically and legally) the gas transit function of the trunk pipeline from the domestic 
Ukrainian gas distribution network”.89 Another major advantage of the consortium 
project would be its potential to comprehensively refurbish the old-fashioned 
pipeline system, lowering the transit and facility risks for the EU.90 
  The success of the tripartite gas pipeline consortium will largely depend on 
whether Russia will agree to a legally binding dispute settlement procedure,  as 
envisaged by the ECT. However, since there is no reason to believe that Russia will 
ratify the ECT in the foreseeable future, a new and less ambitious legal framework 
should be envisaged. It will be crucial to find a compromise that is acceptable for 
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both Russia and Ukraine: Russia will refuse a strong legal framework for the tripartite 
consortium while Ukraine will reject any proposal that could entail Russia’s long-term 
dominance over the pipeline transit system. In addition, with regard to the enormous 
challenges that the setup of a gas consortium would imply, Nies was right to affirm 
that  
la complexité du groupe, le potentiel du conflit russo-ukrainien et l’initiative 
parallèle des deux belligérants d’impliquer l’UE comme arbitre pourraient 
compromettre la coopération dès le départ.91 
  Without a doubt, although the realisation of the consortium idea is rather 
complicated and would not completely resolve the transit issue, it “could contribute 
greatly to EU gas security”.92  
 
5.2.3   The diversification of import routes 
The first branch of the North Stream pipeline has become operational on 8 
November 2011. Russian gas is now directed directly to the EU, allowing reducing the 
transit volume through Ukraine by 25%.93 This diversification in import routes has  a 
positive impact on the EU’s overall SoS. However, it is rather questionable whether 
North Stream will improve the SoS situation in some Eastern member states that would 
need it the most due to their high vulnerability to Ukrainian transit.  
With a capacity of bringing about 60 bcm to the EU each year, the planned 
South Stream pipeline could help to reduce Ukrainian transit, too.94 However, it is by 
far not sure whether this pipeline will be built since the current low demand for gas 
may postpone this investment. Moreover, Serbia would be involved as transit country 
which may trigger additional transit risks. 
The upgrade of the EU’s LNG regasification capacity could be an additional 
instrument that would contribute to the containment of the EU’s current transit risk.95 
Thereby, the EU should support the construction of LNG regasification terminals in 
those member states and regions that are particularly exposed to problems of transit 
risk. Simultaneously, this would also help mitigate the source risk in those member 
states. Of course, the increased LNG imports would not be a general substitute for 
traditional pipeline imports but rather “improve security of supply by helping to 
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accommodate seasonal shortages”.96 As LNG supplies are nearly always available 
on the global market, an enhanced LNG import capacity would indeed give the EU 
a guarantee that the consequences of a short-term pipeline gas shortage would be 
limited. 
Although the significance of Ukraine as the EU’s most important transit country 
will be reduced through new import routes,97 they will alone not have the potential 
to resolve the Ukrainian transit problem. In the long term, both the EU and Russia do 
not have any promising alternative to the transit through Ukraine.98 Even if South 
Stream will be built in addition to the North Stream pipeline and increased LNG 
imports, a considerable share of gas will still be transported to the EU through Ukraine 
because, even combined, they cannot replace the Ukrainian transit volume.99 Thus, 
the focus should not be on how to replace Ukrainian transit but how do deal with it. 
The diversification of the EU’s import routes should be considered as an additional 
option in the risk management, building on the success of the Energy Community 
and/or a tripartite gas consortium.  
 
5.3   Management of investment and facility risk 
  The management of the investment and facility risk entails a particular 
challenge: compared to the management of other risks, it is by far more difficult to 
predict the scale of the risk that stems from cancelled or postponed investments 
whose consequence the EU will face only in ten to fifteen years. In addition, the EU’s 
power to influence the time and scope of investment decisions in the Ukrainian 
pipeline system and the Russian upstream sector is rather limited. 
  As long as the energy world is still shaped by uncertainty following the 
financial and economic crisis, the EU’s focus should be on measures to avoid 
additional uncertainty among investors. The EU should be transparent about its gas 
demand projections for the future. Moreover, it should deal carefully with projects 
that could have a considerable impact on the EU’s future demand for gas. Since the 
replication of the US shale gas revolution in the EU and the construction of the 
Nabucco pipeline could lower the EU’s demand for Russian gas tremendously, those 
projects should be dealt with utmost caution. From the EU’s point of view, it would be 
equally unwise to use the increase of LNG imports as a leverage to put pressure on 
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Russia: this will only result in giving further disincentives for investments in the Russian 
upstream sector. New gas import sources should be presented by the EU as 
additional gas supplies that are not meant to replace traditional supplies from Russia. 
  With regard to investments in the Ukrainian pipeline system, the EU should be 
careful, too: the more the EU gives misleading signals concerning efforts to reduce 
Ukraine’s importance as a transit country through the diversification of import routes, 
the less the country will be inclined to carry out large-scale investments in its decrepit 
pipeline system. As has been shown in the last section, in the case of the Ukrainian 
pipeline system the management of the EU’s transit risk has a major impact on the 
investment and facility risk. Thus, both the Energy Community and the prospect of a 
tripartite gas pipeline consortium can lead to a significant improvement of the 
country’s old-fashioned pipeline system.  
By continuing to give Ukraine credits for the modernisation of its pipeline 
system, the EU could contribute to reduce the facility risk even if no long-term 
sustainable solution is found for its ownership of the gas transit network.100 Last but not 
least, the EU should also make sure that sufficient investments are made in its internal 
gas markets. This refers to storage facilities, interconnectors and reverse flow 
capacities. 
 
5.4  Summary 
The analysis of the risk management showed that the source risk could be 
marginally reduced through the increase of gas imports from Norway and LNG in 
some Eastern member states. However, the general replacement of Russian gas 
imports by new gas supplies for the EU as a whole cannot be an option since this is 
economically not feasible. 
The diversification of import routes can only be considered as an additional 
instrument to address the transit risk by reducing the negative effects of a short-term 
supply shortage, but diversification alone does not allow resolving the transit issue. 
While both Ukraine’s membership in the Energy Community and the prospect of a 
tripartite gas consortium have the potential to considerably reduce the transit risk in 
the long term, Russia’s tolerance will be decisive for the success of both projects: if 
Russia will be reluctant to accept Ukraine’s reform process within the Energy 
Community, it is likely to put pressure on Ukraine that will result in no long-term 
improvement of the EU’s SoS. Similarly, in order to be successful, the consortium idea 
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will need a strong legal framework that Russia is not likely to support. Hence, also the 
second hypothesis can be confirmed: the EU’s capacity to efficiently manage the 
Ukraine transit risk in the long term will largely depend on Moscow.  
Despite its sharp increase in the wake of the crisis, the EU’s means to tackle 
the investment and facility risk are rather limited. The focus should be on measures to 
avoid additional uncertainty and on giving appropriate signals to influence the right 
timing of investment decisions. Since the investment and facility risk is manifestly 
interwoven with the source and also transit risks, measures to tackle it should be part 
of a coordinated approach to address the SoS as a whole. 
 
6.   Conclusion 
 
  This paper investigated what the main risks to the EU’s security of gas supply 
are and how they can be reduced. Today, the EU’s SoS situation looks rather sound. 
The new context of the EU’s SoS had a largely positive impact on its gas energy 
security. At least to some degree, the global financial and economic crisis, the 
global rise of LNG, the US shale gas development, and the EU’s energy and climate 
change policy all improved the EU’SoS. However, this might change in the long term. 
The scale of the different risk dimensions related to the import of gas changed 
in recent years: while the transit risk, and especially the investment and facility risk, 
increased significantly, the source risk became less important. At the same time, the 
EU’s vulnerability to the risks changed. Today, the transit risk represented by Ukraine 
must be considered by far the most threatening to the EU’s SoS both in the short and 
long term. Hereby, the SoS concept developed by Stern proved to be an extremely 
useful tool to analyse the EU’s SoS in more detail. Through the Energy Community or a 
tripartite gas consortium, the EU may significantly reduce the transit risk stemming 
from Russian gas imports and Ukrainian transit. However, the success of both projects 
will be limited by Russia’s policies towards Ukraine. 
  Hence, paradoxically the highest risk that stems from Russia as the EU’s main 
gas supplier is not its potential to cut off gas deliveries to the EU but to forestall the 
EU’s capacity to manage the Ukrainian transit risk. Thus, Russia will in the foreseeable 
time remain the EU’s main partner not only in the gas trade itself but also  in the 
management of the risks to the EU’s gas SoS. Therefore, the EU’s efforts to diversify its 
gas import sources and routes –  strategies  often  considered the most efficient to 
strengthen the EU’s energy security – have only a very limited potential to success-
fully address the main risk to the EU’s secure supply of natural gas.  EU Diplomacy Papers 10/2011 
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  All of the EU’s member states face different SoS levels. While this may require 
an individual risk management by the national governments, the EU should make 
sure that these national risk management strategies are always consistent with the 
EU’s overall risk management. Moreover, the EU can clearly provide an added value 
by encouraging cross-border  policies that improve the SoS in member states of 
Eastern Europe. Here, some member states face a relatively high source, transit and 
facility and investment risk. By coordinating between the member states, the EU can 
make sure that the risk management is carried out in the most cost-efficient way.  
This paper argued that (1) the transit risk is the most threatening to the EU’ SoS 
and (2) the EU’s risk management capacities will depend heavily on Russia’s policies 
towards Ukraine. Shapovalova was right to claim the following: “As the main route for 
Russian gas into Europe, Ukraine is vital to both European and Russian energy 
security.” 101 Much will depend on how successful the EU will be in convincing 
Moscow that addressing the Ukrainian transit risk is a matter of common interest. 
 
 
   
                                                           
101 N. Shapovalova, “The battle for Ukraine’s energy allegiance”, FRIDE Policy Brief, no. 55, 
Madrid, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, 2010, p. 1. Anselm Ritter 
26 
 
Bibliography 
 
Articles 
 
Baev, Pavel & Øverland, Indra, “The South Stream versus Nabucco pipeline race: geopolitical 
and economic (ir)rationales and political stakes in mega-projects”, International Affairs, vol. 
86, no. 5, 2010, pp. 1075-1090. 
Behrens, Arno, “Learning from the Crisis: A Market Approach to Securing European Natural 
Gas Supplies”, CEPS Policy Brief, no. 183, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2009. 
Behrens, Arno, Checchi, Arianna & Egenhofer, Christian, “Long-Term Energy Security Risks for 
Europe: A Sector-Specific Approach”, CEPS Working Document, no. 309, Brussels, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, 2009. 
Behrens, Arno, Egenhofer, Christian & Pedersen, Knud, “Energy Policy for Europe. Identifying 
the European added-value”,  CEPS Task Force Report, Brussels, Centre for European Policy 
Studies, 2008. 
Behrens, Arno & Egenhofer, Christian, “Resource politics: the rapidly shifting EU energy policy 
agenda”, in Heywood, Paul et al.  (eds.),  Developments in European Politics, 2nd edition, 
Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming. 
Cayrade, Patrick, “Investments in Gas Pipelines and Liquefied Natural Gas Infrastructure. 
What is the Impact on the Security of Supply?”, INDES Working Paper, no. 3, Brussels, Centre 
for European Policy Studies, 2004. 
CEPS et al., EU Energy Markets in Gas and Electricity – State of Play and Implementation, 
Study for the ITRE Committee, IP/A/ITRE/ST/2009-14, PE 433.459, Brussels, European Parliament, 
2010. 
Checchi, Arianna, “Gas Interconnectors in Europe: More than a Funding Issue”, CEPS 
Commentary, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 9 April 2009. 
Chevalier, Jean-Marie, “Security of energy supply for the European Union”, European Review 
of Energy Markets, vol. 1, no. 3, 2006, pp. 1-20. 
Christie, Edward Hunter, “EU natural gas demand: uncertainty, dependence and bargaining 
power”, PEI Electronic Publications 17/2010, Turku, Pan-European Institute, 2010. 
Egenhofer, Christian, Legge, Thomas & Nyquist, Carl-Erik, “Security of Energy Supply:  A 
Question for Policy or the Markets?”, Report of a CEPS Working Party, Brussels, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, 2001. 
Emerson, Michael, “Time for a Tripartite Gas Pipeline Consortium for Ukraine”, CEPS 
Commentary, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 8 June 2010. 
Emerson, Michael and Gnedina, Elena, “The Case for a Gas Transit Consortium in Ukraine: A 
Cost-Benefit Analysis”, CEPS Policy Brief, no. 180, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 
2009. 
Goldthau, Andreas &  Witte, Jan Martin,  Global energy governance:  The new rules of the 
game, Berlin, Global Public Policy Institute, 2010. 
Górska, Anna & Matuszak, Sławomir, “Ukraine and Russia: a hindered rapprochement”, OSW 
Commentary, issue 44, Warsaw, Centre for Eastern Studies, 2010.  
Grätz, Jonas & Westphal, Kirsten, “Die Ukraine in der Energiegemeinschaft: Die Zukunft des 
Gastransits. Der ukrainische Gasmarkt zwischen Monopolisierung und Entflechtung”, [Ukraine 
as member of the Energy Community: the future of the gas transit. The Ukrainian gas market 
between monopolization and disentanglement], SWP-Aktuell,  no.  13,  Berlin,  Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, 2011.  EU Diplomacy Papers 10/2011 
27 
 
Harbo, Florentina, “The European Gas and Oil Market: The Role of Norway”, Gouvernance 
européenne et géopolitique de l’énergie, Paris, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 
2008. 
Henry, François-Loïc, “Europe’s Gas Supply Security: Rating Source Country Risk”, CEPS Policy 
Brief, no. 220, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2010. 
Honoré, Anouk, “Economic recession and natural gas demand in Europe: what happened in 
2008-2010?”, NG 47, Oxford, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2011. 
Hulbert, Matthew, “Unconventional gas: Producer pickle or consumer curse?”, CSS Analysis, 
no. 76, Zürich, Center for Security Studies, 2010. 
Kefferpütz, Roderick, “Shale Fever: Replicating the US gas revolution in the EU?”, CEPS Policy 
Brief, no. 210, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2010. 
Larsson, Robert, Tackling Dependency: The EU and its Energy Security Challenges, Stockholm, 
Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2007. 
Lewiner, Colette, “The Financial Crisis and its Impact on European Energy Security of Supply”, 
ParisTech Review, Paris, The Paris Institute of Technology, 29 July 2010, retrieved 1 May 2011, 
www.paristechreview.com/2010/07/29/financial-crisis-impact-european-energy-security-
supply  
Macintosh, Andrew, “Security of Europe’s Gas Supply: EU Vulnerability”, CEPS Policy Brief, no. 
222, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2010. 
Malyhina, Kateryna,  “Die Erdgasversorgung der EU unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der 
Ukraine als Transitland” [The impact of Ukraine as transit on the EU’s gas security of supply], 
Arbeitspapiere und Materialien, no. 105, Bremen, Forschungsstelle Osteuropa, 2009.  
Nies, Susanne, “Ukraine : un pays de transit dans l’impasse ? Edition actualisée après les 
élections de 2010”, Gouvernance européenne et géopolitique de l’énergie,  no. 9, Paris, 
Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 2010, retrieved 1 May 2011, www.ifri.org/ 
?page=detail-contribution&id=5981&id_provenance=96 
Noël, Pierre, “Beyond dependence: how to deal with Russian gas”, Policy Brief, London, 
European Council on Foreign Relations, 2008.  
Paszyc, Ewa, “Nord and South Stream won’t save Gazprom”, OSW Commentary, Issue 35, 
Warsaw, Centre for Eastern Studies, 2010. 
Pirani, Simon, “Ukraine’s gas sector”, NG 21, Oxford, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2007. 
Riley, Alan, “The Coming of the Russian Gas Deficit: Consequences and Solutions”, CEPS 
Policy Brief, no. 116, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2006. 
Rühl, Christoph, “Global Energy After the Crisis. Prospects and Priorities”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 
89, no. 2, 2010, pp. 20-24. 
Shapovalova, Natalia, “The battle for Ukraine’s energy allegiance”, FRIDE Policy Brief, no. 55, 
Madrid, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, 2010.  
Shapovalova, Natalia, “Ukraine: Lynchpin for European Energy Security”, FRIDE Democracy 
Backgrounders, Madrid, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, 
2007.  
Stern, Jonathan, Security of European Natural Gas Supplies:  The  Impact of Import 
Dependence and Liberalization. London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2002. 
Stevens, Paul, “Transit troubles: Pipelines as a source of conflict”, A Chatham House Report, 
London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2009, retrieved 1 May 2011, 
www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/13571_r0309_pipelines.pdf  
Umbach, Frank, “Global energy security and the implications for the EU”, Energy Policy, vol. 
38, no. 3, 2010, pp. 1229–1240. Anselm Ritter 
28 
 
Yafimava, Katja, “The June 2010 Russian-Belarusian gas transit dispute: a surprise that was to 
be expected”, NG 43, Oxford, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2010. 
 
Electronic sources 
 
Auer, Josef, “Gas glut reaches Europe. Major impacts on prices, security and market 
structure”, EU Monitor 75, Deutsche Bank Research, Frankfurt/M., 2010, retrieved 1 May 2011, 
www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000259898.pdf. 
BBC, “EU to attend gas summit in Moscow”, 15 January 2009, retrieved 1 May 2011, 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7830517.stm  
Holland, Bill &  Santa-Maria, Samantha, “Will India emerge energy powerhouse via shale 
gas?”,  The Economic Times of India,  17 February 2011, retrieved 1 May 2011, 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/policy/will-india-emerge-energy-powerhouse-
via-shale-gas/articleshow/7512828.cms?curpg=1. 
Lajtai, Roland, “LNG vs. Russian gas dependency in the South Eastern European region”, 
Paper presented at the 24th World Gas Conference, Buenos Aires, 5-9 October 2009, retrieved 
1 May 2011, www.igu.org/html/wgc2009/papers/docs/wgcFinal00771.pdf  
Ryabkova, Daria, “Ukraine and Energy Community: The law of attraction of energy”, 
European Focus, International Centre for Policy Studies, Kiev, 2009, retrieved 1 May 2011, 
www.icps.com.ua/files/articles/54/64/EF_October_2009_ENG.pdf 
Unihovskyi, Leonid et al., “Diversification of sources and routes of gas supply: the choice for 
Europe and Ukraine”, National Security and Defence, no. 6, Kiev, Razumkov Centre, 2009, 
retrieved 1 May 2011, www.uceps.org/eng/files/category_journal/NSD110_eng_3.pdf  
Van der Linde, Coby et al., “Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics,” Final Report, 
Clingendael International Energy Programme, The Hague, Institute for International Relations 
‘Clingendael’, 2004. 
Wood, Ruth et al., Shale gas: a provisional assessment of climate change and environmental 
impacts. Manchester, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, 2011, retrieved 1 May 
2011, www.tyndall.ac.uk/sites/default/files/coop_shale_gas_report_final_200111.pdf. 
 
Documents 
 
Energy Community, Secretariat, Annual Report on the Implementation of the Acquis under 
the Treaty Establishing the Energy Community, Vienna, 2010. 
European Commission, DG Climate Action, The EU climate and energy package, Brussels, 18 
October 2010, retrieved 1 May 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/ 
index_en.htm  
European Commission, DG Energy, Security of gas supply in the EU, Brussels, 2010, retrieved 1 
May 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/security/gas/gas_en.htm  
International Energy Agency, Medium-term oil & gas markets 2010. Executive summary, Paris, 
2010. 
International Energy Agency, Security of gas supply in open markets: LNG and power at a 
turning point, Paris, 2004. 
International Energy Agency, The Impact of the Financial and Economic Crisis on Global 
Energy Investment, Paris, 2009.  
International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2010, Paris, 2010. 
   EU Diplomacy Papers 10/2011 
29 
 
 
List of EU Diplomacy Papers 
 
 
1/2006 
Karel De Gucht, Shifting EU Foreign Policy into Higher Gear 
2/2006 
Günter Burghardt, The European Union’s Transatlantic Relationship 
 
1/2007  
Jorge Sampaio, Global Answers to Global Problems: Health as a Global Public Good 
2/2007 
Jean-Victor Louis, The European Union: from External Relations to Foreign Policy? 
3/2007  
Sieglinde Gstöhl, Political Dimensions of an Externalization of the EU’s Internal Market 
4/2007 
Jan Wouters, The United Nations and the European Union: Partners in Multilateralism 
5/2007 
Martin Konstantin Köhring, Beyond ‘Venus and Mars’: Comparing Transatlantic 
Approaches to Democracy Promotion 
6/2007 
Sahar Arfazadeh Roudsari, Talking Away the Crisis? The E3/EU-Iran Negotiations on 
Nuclear Issues 
 
1/2008 
Yann Boulay, L’Agence Européenne de Défense : avancée décisive ou désillusion 
pour une Europe de la défense en quête d’efficacité ? 
2/2008 
Pier Carlo Padoan, Europe and Global Economic Governance 
3/2008 
Sieglinde Gstöhl, A Neighbourhood Economic Community - finalité économique for 
the ENP? 
4/2008 
Davide Bonvicini (ed.), Playing Three-Level Games in the Global Economy – Case 
Studies from the EU 
5/2008 
Fredrick Lee-Ohlsson, Sweden and the Development of the European Security and 
Defence Policy: A Bi-Directional Process of Europeanisation 
6/2008 
Anne-Claire Marangoni, Le financement des operations militaires de l’UE : des choix 
nationaux pour une politique européenne de sécurite et de défense ? 
7/2008 
Jing Men, EU-China Relations: from Engagement to Marriage? 
8/2008 
Giuseppe Balducci, Inside Normative Power Europe: Actors and Processes in the 
European Promotion of Human Rights in China Anselm Ritter 
30 
 
 
1/2009 
Monika Tocha, The EU and Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Testing the Limits of Coercive 
Diplomacy 
2/2009 
Quinlan Carthane, A Misleading Promise? Rethinking European Support for Biofuels 
3/2009 
Joris Larik, Two Ships in the Night or in the Same Boat Together? Why the European 
Court of Justice Made the Right Choice in the Kadi Case 
4/2009 
Alice Serar,  Tackling Today's Complex Crises: EU-US Cooperation in Civilian Crisis 
Management 
5/2009 
Judith Huigens & Arne Niemann, The EU within the G8: A Case of Ambiguous and 
Contested Actorness 
6/2009 
Mathias Dobbels, Serbia and the ICTY: How Effective Is EU Conditionality? 
7/2009 
Hugo de Melo Palma, European by Force and by Will: Portugal and the European 
Security and Defence Policy 
8/2009 
Paul Meerts (ed.), Negotiating with the Russian Bear: Lessons for the EU? 
9/2009 
Anne Tiedemann, EU Market Access Teams: New Instruments to Tackle Non-tariff 
Barriers to Trade 
 
1/2010 
Severin Peters, Strategic Communication for Crisis Management Operations of 
International Organisations: ISAF Afghanistan and EULEX Kosovo 
2/2010 
Sophie Lecoutre, The US Shift towards ‘Smart Power’ and its Impact on the 
Transatlantic Security Partnership 
3/2010 
Herman Van Rompuy, The Challenges for Europe in a Changing World 
4/2010 
Camilla Hansen, Non-Governmental Organisations and the European Union’s 
Promotion of Human Rights in China: NGO Influence or NO Influence?  
5/2010 
Egemen Bağış, Turkey's EU Membership Process: Prospects and Challenges 
6/2010 
Jan Steinkohl, Normative Power Rivalry? The European Union, Russia and the 
Question of Kosovo 
7/2010 
André Ghione, Pushing the Boundaries: DG Enlargement between Internal and 
External Environments EU Diplomacy Papers 10/2011 
31 
 
8/2010 
Athanasia Kanli, Is the European Union Fighting the War for Children? The EU Policy 
on the Rights of Children Affected by Armed Conflict 
9/2010 
Jan Weisensee, Measuring European Foreign Policy Impact: The EU and the Georgia 
Crisis of 2008 
10/2010 
Mario Giuseppe Varrenti, EU Development Cooperation after Lisbon: The Role of the 
European External Action Service 
11/2010 
Nicole Koenig, The EU and NATO: Towards a Joint Future in Crisis Management? 
 
1/2011 
Mitja Mertens, The International Criminal Court: A European Success Story? 
2/2011 
Mireia Paulo Noguera, The EU-China Strategic Partnership in Climate Change: The 
Biodiversity Programme 
 
3/2011 
Bart van Liebergen, American War, European Struggle? Analyzing the Influence of 
Domestic Politics on the ISAF Contributions of EU Member States 
4/2011 
Dieter Mahncke, Post-modern Diplomacy: Can EU Foreign Policy Make a Difference 
in World Politics? 
5/2011 
Erika Márta Szabó, Background Vocals: What Role for the Rotating Presidency in the 
EU’s External Relations post-Lisbon? 
6/2011 
Charles Thépaut, Can the EU Pressure Dictators? Reforming ENP Conditionality after 
the ‘Arab Spring’ 
7/2011 
Jannik Knauer, EUFOR Althea: Appraisal and Future Perspectives of the EU’s Former 
Flagship Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
8/2011 
Paul Quinn (ed.), Making European Diplomacy Work: Can the EEAS Deliver? 
9/2011 
Nathan Dufour, Thinking Further about EU-Russia Cooperation: Drug Trafficking and 
Related Issues in Central Asia 
10/2011 
Anselm Ritter, The EU’s Gas Security of Supply: Risk Analysis and Management 
 
   Anselm Ritter 
32 
 
College of Europe Studies 
 
Series Editors:  
Govaere I. / Gstöhl S. / Hanf D. / Lannon E. /  
 Monar J. / Pelkmans J. 
 
Order online at www.peterlang.com 
 
Europe is in a constant state of flux. European politics, economics, law and indeed European societies 
are changing rapidly. The European Union itself is in a continuous situation of adaptation. New 
challenges and new requirements arise continually, both internally and externally. The College of 
Europe Studies series seeks to publish research on these issues done at the College of Europe, both at its 
Bruges and its Natolin (Warsaw) campus. Focused on the European Union and the European 
integration process, this research may be specialised in the areas of political science, law or 
economics, but much of it is of an interdisciplinary nature. The objective is to promote understanding of 
the issues concerned and to make a contribution to ongoing discussions. 
 
vol. 14  Lannon, Erwan (ed.), The European Neighbourhood Policy's Challenges / Les défis de la politique 
européenne de voisinage, 2012 (491 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-779-2 pb. 
vol. 13 Cremona, Marise / Monar, Jörg / Poli, Sara (eds.), The External Dimension of the European Union's Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, 2011 (434 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-728-0 pb. 
vol. 12 Men, Jing / Balducci, Giuseppe (eds.), Prospects and Challenges for EU-China Relations in the 21st Century: 
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 2010 (262 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-641-2 pb. 
vol. 11 Monar, Jörg (ed.), The Institutional Dimension of the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, 2010 (268 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-615-3 pb. 
vol. 10 Hanf, Dominik / Malacek, Klaus / Muir Elise (dir.), Langues et construction européenne, 2010 (286 p.), ISBN 
978-90-5201-594-1 br. 
vol. 9  Pelkmans, Jacques / Hanf, Dominik / Chang, Michele (eds.), The EU  Internal Market in Comparative 
Perspective: Economic, Political and Legal Analyses, 2008 (314 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-424-1 pb. 
vol. 8 Govaere, Inge / Ullrich, Hans (eds.), Intellectual Property, Market Power and the Public Interest, 2008 (315 p.), 
ISBN 978-90-5201-422-7 pb. 
vol. 7 Inotai, András, The European Union and Southeastern Europe: Troubled Waters Ahead?, 2007 (414 p.), ISBN 
978-90-5201-071-7 pb. 
vol. 6 Govaere, Inge / Ullrich, Hanns (eds.), Intellectual Property, Public Policy, and International Trade, 2007 (232 
p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-064-9 pb. 
vol. 5 Hanf, Dominik / Muñoz, Rodolphe (eds.), La libre circulation des personnes: États des lieux et perspectives, 
2007 (329 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-061-8 pb. 
vol. 4  Mahncke, Dieter / Gstöhl, Sieglinde (eds.),  Europe's Near Abroad: Promises and Prospects of the EU's 
Neighbourhood Policy, 2008 (318 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-047-2 pb. 
vol. 3 Mahncke, Dieter / Monar, Jörg (eds.), International Terrorism: A European Response to a Global Threat?, 2006 
(191p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-046-5 / US-ISBN 978-0-8204-6691-0 pb. 
vol. 2 Demaret, Paul / Govaere, Inge / Hanf, Dominik (eds.), European Legal Dynamics - Dynamiques juridiques 
européennes, Revised and updated edition of 30 Years of European Legal Studies at the College of Europe, 2005 / 
2007 (571 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-067-0 pb. 
vol. 1 Mahncke, Dieter / Ambos, Alicia / Reynolds, Christopher (eds.), European Foreign Policy: From Rhetoric to 
Reality?, 2004 (381 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-247-6/ US-ISBN 978-0-8204-6627-9 pb.  